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SIRN (Synergetic Inter-Representation Networks): an
approach to design
J. Portugali Tel Aviv University, Israel
H. Casakin Tel Aviv University, Israel

Abstract
Our aim in this paper is to examine the relation between design and cognition in light of two aspects
related to these disciplines: (a) Cognitive science’s negative attitude toward artifacts. (b) The fact
that artifacts are the subject matter and end product of design. In our paper we firstly discuss
cognitive science’s attitude toward artifacts and show that it contradicts the reflective-interaction
approach that currently dominates the discipline of design. We then introduce SIRN (Synergetic
inter-Representation Networks) as an approach that resolves this contradiction by treating artifacts
and their design as innately related to cognition. We close the paper by discussing further research
directions.
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SIRN (Synergetic Inter-Representation Networks): an
approach to design
The status of design in the cognitive science
The status of design in the cognitive science is somewhat ambivalent. To a large extent this is due
to cognitive science’s attitude toward artifacts, which are the subject matter of the design process.
Artifacts, as noted by Simon (1979), have a negative air around them – one doesn’t want artifacts in
one’s data or empirical results. This is so in science in general and this is so in cognitive science. Its
emergence was associated with an attempt to transform the “soft” study of mind, thought,
imagination and language into a “hard” empirical and analytical cognitive science –The Mind’s New
Science (Gardner, 1987). The negative attitude toward artifacts was (and still is) typical mainly of
classical cognitivism according to which artifacts are simply ‘not cognitive’. They are the product
of human actions, which are the outcome of cognition, and as such bodily artifacts, but not
cognition itself. The following section by Chomsky on external and internal languages (E- vs. Ilanguages respectively) is indicative:
“E-languages are mere artifacts. . . the concept appears to play no role in the theory of language. .
. The technical concept of E-language is a dubious one in at least two respects. In the first place, ..
languages in this sense are not real-world objects but are artificial, somewhat arbitrary, and
perhaps not very interesting constructs. In contrast ... statements about I-language ... are true or
false statements about something real and definite, about actual states of the mind/brain and their
components ... “(Chomsky 1986, 26-7, italics added).
From this view on cognition and artifacts follows two possible positions of design in relation to
cognition. First, design, like thinking, is part of cognition while bodily action and artifacts are not.
Here the process of design is essentially distinct and separated from its product – the artifact.
Second, design is part of the production of artifacts and therefore it is not cognitive.
Cognitive science’s negative attitude toward artifacts is currently changing. A growing number of
studies depart from this sort of hard cognitivism. Rumelhart et al (1986) and Cole (1996) neoVygotskian approaches, Edelman’s (1992) TNGS (Theory of Neural Group Selection), Johnson’s
(1987) and Lakoff’s (1987) approach of experiential realism, Donald’s (1991) notion of the
externalization of memory, and the recent pragmatist views of embodied cognition (Varela et al
1994) as well as the action-perception approaches (Thelen 1995, Thelen and Smith 1994, Kelso
1995, Freeman 1999) among others, all tend to see the cognitive system as including the body and
its interaction with the environment and/or elements in it. These approaches suggest that in certain
tasks and contexts cognition is confined to the brain; in others to the whole body and in some tasks
and contexts the cognitive system includes the brain, the body and even stand-alone artifacts in the
environment. The latter possibility refers to cases where artifacts function as an extension of the
body – a view suggested by Gibson (1979) and reproduced here in Fig. 1.
From the above perspectives it follows that bodily artifacts are part of cognition while stand-alone
artifacts are only in cases where they function as an extension to the body. In themselves, however,
stand-alone artifacts and the process of their production are not cognitive. This view does not
change the status of design in the cognitive science, at least not the design of stand-alone artifacts.
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Figure 1: Scissor as extension of the body

A concise history of design methods: the two major approaches
Over the last forty years, developments in cognitive science have been significant to different
human related fields including design and urban design. Influenced by the classical cognitive
sciences of the 1960s, the so-called ‘design methods’ approach proposed analytical/rational
problem solving techniques. The main concept was that designers should be capable of predicting
the effects and consequences of their designs, and describe the actions and steps that are necessary
to achieve them. The design methodology movement paid little attention to the design solutions per
se, and became much more concerned with the large network of predictions and specifications
through the different phases of the design process (Jones, 1980; Lawson, 1980). With the aim of
formalizing design processes, the design methods movement proposed prescriptive models of
design, which were based on the idea that the different steps in the design process can be optimized
and defined a priori. Thus, a strong emphasis was set on logical and objective analyses of the design
process. A main example of this approach was the revolutionary paradigm presented by Simon in
the early 1970s (Simon, 1973). In his view, design is seen as a rational search process, in which the
design problem is defined by a problem space. This problem space is carefully explored while
searching for a ‘satisfying’ design solution. However, Simon’s and other similar approaches did not
take into account the individual properties and characteristics of the designer that they were
supposed to support. According to Dorst and Dijkhuis (1995), the main emphasis of the ‘rational
problem solving approach’ was set on the process components of the design activity, but the
movement was unsuccessful to understand the knowledge structures of what designers perceive and
think. As a consequence the design methods movement failed to support real design problems.
In recent years, the study of cognitive processes concerned with problem-solving activities began to
capture the interest of design researchers. It was postulated that while solving problems under
controlled conditions, individuals might be able to externalize representations of their internal
mental processes. In contrast to the rational movement the major attempt of which was toward
prescriptive design models, recent studies proposed descriptive design models that strongly
emphasise the cognitive dimension of design (e.g., Cross, 2000). The main idea was to focus on the
interplay between the designer’s internal and external representations in the early stages of the
design process An example is the pioneering work of Schon (1983) on design as reflection in
action. Schon argued that the view of design as a rational problem solving process weakened the
understanding of unique design problems. Basing his approach on a constructionist view of human
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perception-and thought processes (Dorst, 1996) he perceived design as a reflective conversation
between the designer and the external situation (named the environment). By identifying relevant
aspects from the design problem, the designer chooses a problem situation, or frames the problem
according to a particular situation, and develops a possible solution while evaluating and reflecting
upon the design outcome (named the design artifact). These enable him/her to check his/her
understanding of the problem situation, to create a new framing of the situation. And to verify
his/her interpretation of it on the basis of prior experiences. Current cognitive research based on the
analysis of design thinking and design behavior, saw in Schon’s approach a potential tool for
enhancing our understanding on the design process.

Discussion
As noted above, from the point of view of cognitive science, stand-alone artifacts are essentially
external to the cognitive system and process. In some circumstances they function as an extension
of the body, but in themselves they are not cognitive. Such a view corresponds to Simon’s paradigm
on design as a rational problem solving process, the end product of which is an artifact. Schon’s
reflexive conversation view is somewhat different. The designer “talks” to the environment and the
latter “talks back” to the designer. Here the designer (person) and the designed (artifact) form two
parts of a single design system.
Schon’s main concern is the process of design and he therefore makes no claims about the cognitive
process. Our concern is to look at the process of design from the point of view of cognitive
mapping and the cognition of large-scale artifacts such as cities. From this perspective we suggest,
first, that the ‘reflective conversation’ view on design contradicts cognitive science’s view on
artifacts. Second that it indicates the possibility to understand the cognitive system as including in
addition to perception and action also productions (Fig. 2). Third, that the action-perceptionproduction view of cognition implies that design is an innate human capability active in the
production of small as well as large artifacts such as cities. These three suggestions are derivations
from the notion of SIRN that is introduced next.

Figure 2: Action/Perception/Production view on cognition

SIRN’s four propositions and design
SIRN is an approach to cognition suggesting that artifacts and the process of their design and
production are part of cognition (Portugali, 1996; Haken and Portugali, 1996). In this section we
introduce SIRN and show its implications to design. We do so by examining the SIRN’s four basic
propositions.
1. Humans have an innate capability for representation that comes in two forms: external and
internal. Internal representations are the outcome of brain processes the end product of which is
various forms of information (visual, olfactory, haptic, lingual, etc.,) that are enfolded (i.e.
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represented) in the matter of the brain. External representations refer to behavior or action that
represent internal representations. External representations can be further divided into bodily and
stand-alone representations. Bodily representations (mimetic, lexical, etc.) are made by the body
and never extend beyond it. Stand-alone representations are made by the body, but extend beyond it
to become stand-alone artifacts. Stand-alone artifacts are the products of design processes. From
this follows three interrelated corollaries: (1) Design is an innate human capability. (2) Humans
perceive, learn, think and execute many cognitive operations by designing and producing artifacts.
(3) Humans design not only in order to achieve goals or intentions, but first and foremost because
they are “born to design” – their innate capability to design and produce artifacts allows them to
achieve many of their aims, intentions and goals by means of the design and production of artifacts.
2. Many cognitive processes, those associated with the production of artifacts included, evolve as
an interaction between internal and external representations. This is typical of complex cognitive
process that are subject to “The magic number seven plus or minus two” that according to Miller
(1956) “… limits our capacity for processing information” in short term memory. In his paper
Miller discusses several tactics by which the mind/brain may overcome this constraint. Haken and
Portugali (forthcoming) suggest that another trick the mind/brain/body uses to overcome this
constraint is by means of external representations and the production of stand-alone artifacts. The
production of artifacts and by implication their design are thus integral parts of the cognitive
process of humans. This is typical of sequential cognitive processes that evolve by means of an
interaction between emergent internal and external representations. Thus, one starts to develop a
thought, or an idea by first constructing it in mind in the form of an internal representation. Then
one develops it a few steps further in short-term memory. When the threshold of Miller’s “magic
number 7” is reached, one externalizes one’s internal representation in the form of a talk, a written
sentence, or a sketch, observes how it looks, etc., then internalizes it again as a starting point for
further development in mind and so on in an interplay between internal and external
representations.
3. The boundaries of the cognitive system should be perceived as distinct from the boundaries of the
brain (the skull) and the body (skin). This is the logical conclusion of propositions 1 –2. In design
tasks, the boundaries of the cognitive system correspond to the boundaries of the design system.
The latter includes the designer’s mind and body, the design action and the produced artifact. That
is, the cognition-design system is composed of action-perception-production.
4. The cognitive system is a self-organizing system the dynamics of which is captured by the
synergetic approach to self-organization. Self-organization is a fundamental property of open and
complex systems that attain their order spontaneously and are typified by phenomena of noncausality, non-linearity, instability and chaos. Such systems are open, in the sense that they
exchange matter, energy and information with their environment, and complex in the sense that
their large number of parts are interconnected in a nonlinear fashion by a complex network of
feedback loops (Portugali 1997, 1999).
Synergetics is Haken’s (1983, 1987) theory of self-organization. The theory focuses on processes
by which the local interactions between the many parts of a system give rise to qualitative changes
at the system’s macroscopic state. According to synergetics such a qualitative macroscopic change
happens when a given internal or external control parameter acting on the system triggers a chaotic
movement and interaction between its many parts. This chaotic movement enfolds several systemic
order states that co-exist and in this respect “compete” among themselves. When the control
parameter crosses a certain threshold, the hitherto chaotic form of movement and interaction
suddenly and spontaneously give rise to a coherent movement and interaction where all the parts
behave in concert. This coherent movement is termed order parameter, and the process by which
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the many parts abruptly “obey” the order parameter and in this way support and reproduce it – the
slaving principle.
Synergetics was applied to the domain of cognition and brain functioning (Haken 1979, 1990, 1991,
1996, Kelso 1995). The basic proposition here is that the brain and its various cognitive systems are
self-organizing systems.The paradigmatic case-study here is pattern recognition by means of
associative memory: the cognitive system is given a few features of a certain pattern (i.e. face)
referring to one out of a repertoire of patterns stored in memory. This triggers a process of selforganization in which several order-states emerge and enter into a competition. This competition is
resolved when a certain order parameter "wins", enslaving the various features by means of
associative memory, and a recognition is established.
A similar process typifies the construction of cognitive maps (Portugali 1990; Portugali and Haken
1992; Portugali, 1996), behavior and action (Kelso 1995). With respect to the latter two, synergetics
suggests seeing the brain, mind, bodily behavior and action as open, complex, task-specific and
context-dependent systems that achieve their coherence spontaneously, by means of a complex cooperation and interaction between their many parts. The interacting elements of that system are,
therefore, both internal and external.

The SIRN basic model and its three prototypes as models of design
Haken and Portugali (1996) have cast the notion of SIRN into the formalism of synergetics. They
have done so by developing the SIRN basic model. The model was inspired by Bartlett‘s
(1932/1961) scenarios of serial reproduction devised by him in his book Remembering. A typical
Bartlett scenario evolves like this (Fig. 3): a test person is given a text or shown a figure and is
asked to memorize it. He or she is then asked to externally reproduce the text or figure out of
memory, by rewriting the text or re-drawing the figure. This externally represented text or figure is
given to another test person and so on. The usual result of such scenarios is that after several strong
fluctuations in the reproduction, the text or the figure stabilize and do not change much from
iteration to iteration. Bartlett reports that the same happens when the experiments are carried out
with a single person. This experiment includes all the ingredients of synergetics and interrepresentation and can thus be regarded as a paradigm case study for the operation of SIRN
(Portugali, 1996; Haken and Portugali, 1996): A play between internal and external representations
that emerge spontaneously out of the dynamics as ad-hoc entities, strong fluctuations at the start and
an ordered state that eventually “enslaves” the interaction.
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Figure 3: A typical Bartlett scenario
The basic SIRN model is described in Fig. 4. In the context of the present paper this model refers to
a designer that is subject to two kinds of input information: internal information that is coming from
the designer’s mind/brain, in the form of ideas, images, thoughts, and the like, and external
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information that is coming from the environment via the senses, the designer’s body and/or the
information afforded from stand-alone artifacts. The interaction between these two flows gives rise
to an order parameter that governs both the designer’s action, and the information that feeds back
from the artifact produced to the designer’s mind. The order parameters are determined in line with
the theory of synergetics as described above.

Figure 4: Basic SIRN model
The basic SIRN model is applied to specific case studies by means of its three prototype submodels of design: (1) Intra-personal, that describes a solitary designer working by him/her self. (2)
Inter-personal that refers to a sequential process involving several solitary designers not necessarily
aware of each other. (3) Inter-personal with a common reservoir that describes a group dynamics
by which several designers are working simultaneously and publicly on a large-scale artifact.

The Intrapersonal submodel
The intrapersonal submodel is described in Figure 5. It refers to the Bartlett’s serial reproduction
experimented with a single person or to a solitary designer engaged in some creative work. A nice
illustration for this process is Brancusi’s Kiss that evolved as a typical process of interaction
between internal and external representations (Figure 6). As can be seen, similarly to the Bartlett
scenario, here too the figure is gradually transformed from a realistic to a highly schematized
geometrical shape. This by means of an interaction between internal representations in the form of
images, ideas, etc., that emerge at the artist’s mind, and external representations that represent the
artist’s ideas and images as they take a specific shape in the material with which the artist is
working. What is specifically interesting in Brancusi’s Kiss is that its final reproduction (The Gate
of Kiss) was imbedded in the cityscape of Bucharest, thus illustrating how a very personal SIRN
process ‘goes public’.
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Figure 5: Intra-personal sub-model by means of SIRN

Figure 6: The evolution of Brancusi’s Kiss
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This process is typical also of the role of sketches in design. Free-hand sketches are frequently
produced by architects and designers at the early stages of the design process. A sketch is
characterized by having an ambiguous and amorphous nature that serves the purposes of clarifying
existing design ideas stored as internal representations in the mind, and generating new ones
through external representations (e.g., Casakin, 1998; Do, et al, 1999; Evans, 1989; Fish and
Scrivener, 1990; Goldschmidt, 1992). Researchers such as Suwa and Tversky (1997) explored the
sketch as a means for gaining a better understanding of how subjects perceive and cognize content
and process components while solving a design problem. Goldschmidt (1994) proposed that the
design process often starts with vague ideas that are gradually elaborated and structured. In this
process of elaboration sketches can aid in generating and strengthening them. Moreover, different
features of a yet non-created artifact can be produced, transformed, and externalized through
sketches for communication and evaluation. Thus, a critical aspect of sketching is the possibility of
generating sequential and abstract design representations before they are clear in the mind. This
enables the identification of relevant from irrelevant information, and on the other hand, the
reinterpretation of previously unforeseen or unpredicted information. As the sketching activity
evolves, an interactive dialogue or reflective conversation is established between the designer
internal representations retrieved from memory, and his or her produced external representations
that ‘talk back’ to him (Schon, 1983; Goel, 1995) until a suitable design solution is reached.
Goldschmidt, (1999) referred to this phenomena as the backtalk of self-generated sketches, which
points to the designer capability to read meaning, and discover new interpretations from his or her
own external representations. Verstijnen (1997), and Verstijnen et al (1999) claimed that when
designers have difficulties of interpretation in mind, the use of the sketch plays an important role as
a tool for aiding idea reinterpretation and problem restructuring. An example of a practical use of
the sketch is illustrated through the work of the architect Jorn Utzon (Figure 7). His sketches are not
intended as the production of just beautiful drawings, but made with the aim of understanding a
design problem, and proposing a design solution (Lawson, 1994). With the purpose of constructing
the roof of the Opera House in Sydney, a rich sequence of sketches are developed to learn about
engineering structural aspects. During this process, a sketch establishes a dialogue with another, as
ideas develop and gradually evolve from evocative conceptual sketches related to rather organic
forms, to more detailed and refined representations.
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Figure 7: Sketches from the Opera House at Sydney, by Jorn Utzon

The difference between the examples of Brancusi and Utzon sketches is that in the case of sketches
the play between internal and external representations continues until the end product – the artifact
– is completed; after this stage the design process ends. In Brancusi’s case “the play never ends” –
the artifact has a status of a sketch.
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The Interpersonal process
This is the classical Bartlett scenario, as illustrated above in Figure 3. A typical experiment starts, as
noted, with a given external input and proceeds with a sequence by which each person's
externalized reproduction of the remembered input becomes an input to the next person to
remember and externalize, and so on. As above, after several initial steps that exhibit major changes
from one reproduction to the other, the story or the drawn figure stabilizes and does not change
significantly from iteration to iteration. In terms of synergetics we assert that a certain order
parameter has enslaved the system and brought it to a steady state. This interpersonal process
implies that several persons, with their individual-subjective cognitive systems, participate in
producing an externalized collective cognitive product, without being aware of their collective
enterprise. As this sequential process evolves, and its collective product constructed, each
individual's externally represented reproduction gradually becomes "more" collective and so does
each individual's internally represented remembering. The individuals engaged in the process are
thus being ‘enslaved’ by the collective order parameter that emerges in the process. Figure 8
graphically describes this interpersonal scenario by means of our SIRN model.

Figure 8: Interpersonal sub-model by means of SIRN
An example in the domain of architecture can be the design of complex artifacts such as public
buildings by a design team composed of structural engineers; environmental engineers; interior
designers; etc. As the design process develops, the problem is decomposed into sub-problems in
order to answer initial programmatic requirements (Cross, 2000). In doing so, designers establish an
interactive dialogue between their own internal and external representations related to their domain
of expertise, and a sequential interplay between external representations of the other designers. A
synergetic, self-organized system among the various designers thus emerges and develops until a
design solution is found.
An additional example is Rossi’s (1986) concept of urban ‘typologies’ as ‘perpetuating
permanencies’ capable of adaptation to modifications performed by different designers through
history. According to Rossi, socially relevant buildings were able to last because they managed to
keep their external formal attributes while adapting their internal functions to new programmatic
requirements, new conditions, and uses. While the design of the building evolves or changes, a
sequential–temporal inter-play of external and internal representations is established between
different architects that are not necessarily aware of each other.
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Interpersonal with a common reservoir
In the intra- and inter-personal sub-models the process depends fully on the biological memories of
individuals. Here the process depends partly on biological memories, but partly also on externalized
non-biological memory termed a common reservoir. This common reservoir of external, artificial
and non-biological memory, might take the form of texts, Internet, buildings or whole cities. To
illustrate and study such processes a set of experiments –city games – was devised (Portugali,
1996b). Their essence is a process of sequential reproduction that is interpersonal, collective, and
public – the participants observe the game as it develops. Each player is given a 1:100 mockup of a
building, and in his/her turn is asked to locate it in the virtual city on the floor. In a typical game
(Figure 9), the players observe the city as it develops, and in the process also learn the
spontaneously emerging order on the ground. After several initial iterations a certain urban order
emerges. The participants internalize this emerging order and tend to locate their buildings in line
with it. Such an experiment includes all the ingredients of the SIRN process: a sequential interplay
between internal and external representations, the emergence of a collective complex city as an
artifact, and a typical synergetic process of self-organization as demonstrated below. It is typical in
such games that after a few initial iterations an observable urban order emerges, the participants
internalize this emerging order and tend to locate their buildings in line with it.

Figure 9: Four snapshots from a typical City Game
Figure 10 illustrates graphically this public-collective SIRN sub-model. Each individual
player/agent is subject to internal input constructed by the mind/brain, and external input which is
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the legible information coming from the common reservoir. In the above city game it is the virtual
city on the ground. The interaction between these two forms of input gives rise to a competition
between alternative decision rules that ends up when one or a few decision rules “wins”. The
winning rule(s) is/are the order parameter(s) that enslave(s) the system. The emerging order
parameter governs an external output, which in the city game is the player’s location action in the
city, and an internal output, which is an information feedback loop back to the mind/brain.
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Figure 10: Interpersonal with a common reservoir sub-model by means of SIRN

Design and self-organization
From the above follows a view of design as essentially a self-organizing system. On the face of it
the two notions ‘design’ and ‘self-organization’ contradict each other: Design is commonly
regarded as an intentional, and as such externally organized process, in contrast with spontaneous
self-organized process. But there is no contradiction here. To see why let us look once again at the
various examples introduced above. Consider first the paradigmatic case study of Bartlett scenario
of serial reproduction (Fig. 3). This scenario includes all the ingredient of a self-organizing,
cognitive, SIRN system: emergent internal and external representations, strong fluctuations at the
start of the process, an emerging order parameter in the form of a schemata of an abstract shape of a
face that eventually enslaves the many parts of the system and brings it to a steady state. A similar
process takes place in the cases of Brancusi’s Kiss (Fig. 6), and Utzon’s sketches (Fig. 7). The
Durling D. & Shackleton J. (Eds.) Common Ground : Design Research Society International Conference 2002, UK. ISBN 1-904133-11-8
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latter two case studies should be taken in conjunction with Miller’s magic number 7 discussed in
Proposition 3. As a consequence of the number 7 constraint on short-term memory, a design idea or
intention are usually not yet the final product but its trigger. The end product, that is to say the
artifact, emerges as noted above out of the SIRN play described above. Many design processes, in
particular those associated with complex artifacts, thus involve a sequential, self-organizing
processes.
The case study of the city game (Figs. 9, 10) refers to a much more complex process of self
organization. As elaborated recently in Self-Organization and the City (Portugali, 1999) the city is a
dual self-organizing system: On the one hand, the city as a whole is a self-organizing system whose
elementary parts are the many agents operating in it. On the other, each of the agents operating in
the city is itself an open, complex and as such self-organizing system. The agents act and interact,
with and in the city, among other things according to their cognitive maps of it. This interaction
give rise to the city dynamics and structure, that once emerges feeds back to the agents’ cognitive
map and so on in a process of circular causality and reproduction. The city in this respect is similar
to language. As in language each of the parts is a self-organizing system and the local interaction
between the parts gives rise to a highly (self) organized global structure. Unlike language, however,
the city is full of planning, design and attempts to control the city. In fact, each agent operating in
the city is a planner/designer at a certain scale (Portugali, 1999, Chap. 11). And yet, due to the size
and complexity of the city, none of the many planners/designers operating in it can fully control its
final form, structure and evolution.
It should be emphasized that many of the planning and design actions taken in a city – the design
and construction of buildings, bridges, roads and the like – require full control and external
organization. But as just noted, in the last analysis none of these designs can fully determine the
overall structure of the city – not even large-scale urban design projects. From this follows two
forms of design: engineerable design that is necessary in the design of some of the urban artifacts,
versus self-organized design that typifies the design of neighborhoods, whole cities and
metropolitan areas.

Concluding notes
Our aims in this paper have been, first, to expose the ambivalent relations between design and
cognition. Second, to introduce SIRN as an approach to cognition suggesting a perception-actionproduction view of cognition. Third, to make a start at introducing SIRN as an approach to design.
The next step, with which we are currently engaged, is to put these ideas into empirical tests. So far
we have done so by means of the city games discussed above and by means of computerized urban
simulation models. Preliminary results indicate, first, that designers never come to the city tabula
rasa. Rather, each comes to, and starts to design in, the city with a conceptual cognitive map (cCM)
that refers to his/her previous experience in cities. The most prominent cCMs were found to be
mono-centric and multi-centric. Second, the first interaction between the designers and the city
gives rise to specific cognitive maps (sCM) that are dynamic and change as the structure of the city
evolves. It is according to sCMs that the design process proceeds. We have also started to
experiment with the two qualitatively distinct design processes noted above – engineerable versus
self-organizing design. However, these and several other experiments and results will have to await
further publication.
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